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INTRODUCTION
N a letter dated February 20, 1952 from President Truman to Mr.
James H. Doolittle,* the President expressed his concern about
"airplane accidents, both commercial and military, that have occurred
in the take-off and landing of aircraft, especially in heavily populated
areas" and the "anxiety in some of our cities" which these accidents
have occasioned. Accordingly, he appointed a Commission (known
as the "President's Airport Commission") consisting of Mr. James H.
Doolittle, as Chairman, Mr. Charles F. Horne, and Dr. Jerome C.
Hunsaker to make a study on the "Nation's policy on airport location
and use." With the assistance of a staff under the directorship of Mr.
S. Paul Johnston, the requested report was prepared and delivered to
the President on May 16, 1952.
As a part of the background for the preparation of the report, the
Commission desired a survey made of the applicable law bearing upon
airport location and use. This article is substantially the same as one
of the Memoranda which was submitted to the Commission as a part
of that survey.
This article, therefore, is designed to discuss some of the legal
ramifications of the basic question raised in any study of airport loca-
tion and use: how can the conflicting interests between airport oper-
ations and the rights of nearby property owners best be resolved?
Legal aspects of possible solutions to this question will also be dis-
cussed.
The first section herein discusses the conflicting claims between
property owners and airports: Under what circumstances may a prop-
*19 JRL. AIR L. & COM. 101 (Winter) and 221 (Spring, 1952).
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erty owner by court action limit the operations of an airport, or, in-
deed, put it out of business altogether? Or, vice versa, under what
circumstances may an airport seek legal remedies to prohibit construc-
tions on adjacent areas which constitute a hazard to air operations?
The second section discusses the scope of a state's authority, either
by itself or through enabling legislation to a municipality or other
authorized public unit, to foster airport growth: Are there any limits
on the exercise of its power of eminent domain to acquire land for
airport construction? Does the fact that an airport was fathered
through state or municipal funds, rather than private capital, or is
licensed by a state commission or a local public body, lessen the rights
which the landowner adjacent to an airport has in the enjoyment of
his property? To what extent can a state adopt zoning laws to protect
airport approaches and when do such zoning 'laws reach the point
where they "take" the property of an adjacent landowner so as to vio-
late a state or the federal constitution?
The third section discusses the scope of the power of the Federal
Government in relation to the problem of airport location: To what
extent may it utilize the power of eminent domain to acquire land for
airport construction and to zone areas adjacent thereto?
Aviation law is a relatively recent arrival on the scene of American
jurisprudence. Accordingly, it is not surprising to find that certain
areas in the questions posed above have not been covered by judicial
decision or legislative action, or indeed, have conflicting decisions
awaiting resolution by the Supreme Court or appropriate legislation.
Where the law is unclear, this article will endeavor to point out the
forum for decisive action, whether it be judicial, legislative (Federal
or State), or Constitutional amendment.
CONFLICTING CLAIMS BETWEEN AIRPORT OPERATIONS AND THE.
RIGHTS OF NEARBY PROPERTY OWNERS
A justifiable summary of the many cases in which this problem
has been involved would be that upon each particular set of facts the
court has endeavored to weigh conflicting equities in reaching a result.
On the one hand there is the property owner who is entitled to the
enjoyment of his property without hazards and undue inconvenience.
On the other hand there is the airport owner who is entitled to a cer-
tain freedom in the operation of his enterprise, and the increasing
interest of the general public in air transportation.
Unfortunately, the law on this matter is so geared to the facts of
each specific case, that it is impossible to give a more precise guide to
the resolution of conflicting interests between airports and land-
owners. An effort will be made, however, to show the average type
of situation which a court is called upon to consider.
But first two preliminary matters should be briefly touched upon
which, while of collateral interest to the basic question, have frequently
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been important factors in the courts' efforts to resolve conflicting
claims.
First of all, the legal basis upon which an aggrieved landowner
seeks relief has called for some attention. Is the proper remedy an
action based upon an alleged "trespass" into the air space above the
property owner's land by aircraft from an adjacent airport' or the
more frequent action alleging a "nuisance" through the result of the
airport's operations which affects the landowner's enjoyment of his
property?2 Important legal consequences may flow from the particu-
lar remedy chosen, for in the case of a trespass nominal damages may
be awarded to the landowner even though no actual damages are
shown.3 In the case of an alleged nuisance, actual damage must be
proven by the landowner.
Secondly, the question of the extent to which a landowner owns
the airspace above his property has become an important question in
some cases. Thus, under 'the "trespass" theory the Court must find
that the airspace invaded was actually owned by the landowner. As
will also be pointed out later, the question of private ownership of
the airspace also comes into play when there is a problem involving
the "taking" of property without the due compensation or the exercise
of the power of eminent domain.
Briefly, as Mr. Charles S. Rhyne has pointed out,4 there have been
five theories advanced regarding the ownership of airspace:
(1) The ancient common law maxim, obviously a flight of the
imagination prior to the development of air transportation, held that
the landowner owned all the airspace up to the "skies." 5 No case has
ever adopted this theory and, indeed, the Supreme Court in United
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) held that this doctrine "has no
place in the modern world."
(2) The landowner owns the air space above his property to an
unlimited extent subject to an "easement" or "privilege" of flight in
the public. This is the theory which was incorporated in the Uniform
State Law for Aeronautics in 1923 presently in effect in a number of
1 This theory has been adopted by some courts: Brandes v. Mitterling 67
Ariz. 349, 196 P (2nd) 464 (1948); Burnham v. Beverly Airways, Inc. 311 Mass.
628, 42 N.E. (2d) 575 (1942); Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass.
511, 170 N.E. 385 (1930); Vanderslice v. Shaun, 26 Del.Ch. 225, 27 A (2d) 87
(1942); Commonwealth v. Nevin & Smith 1928 USAvR 39 (Ct. 2. Sess. Jeff. Ct.,
Pa. 1922).
2 Most state courts follow this theory. e.g. Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 178
Ga. 514, 173 S.E. 817 (1934). The Supreme Court has specifically rejected the
trespass theory stating that "common sense revolts" at the idea of "countless
trespass suits" in airspace. United States v. Causby 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946).
3 In the Burnham case, note 1 supra, $1. damages were awarded.
4 Rhyne, Airports and the Courts (1944), pages 154 to 162. Rhyne, Airport
Legislation and Court Decisions, 14 J. of Air Law and Com. 289 (1947). These
two studies of Mr. Rhyne are an excellent coverage of the field of airport opera-
tions and are heavily relied upon herein for the period prior to 1948.
5 "Cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum." 1 Coke, Institutes 19th ed. 1832,
Ch. 1, para. 1(4a). See also Sweeney, Adjusting the Conflicting Interests of
Landowner and Aviator in Anglo-American Law, 3 Jrl. of Air Law 329, 531
(1932).
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states.6 The Restatement of the Law of Torts of the American Law
Institute in 1934 also embodied this theory.7 The courts of a few
states still discuss conflicting claims between airport and landowner
in terms of this theory.8
(3) The landowner owns the air space up to such heights as is
fixed by statute, with flights under that height being "trespasses." This
theory has found acceptance primarily in Massachusetts. One Federal
court would appear to adopt the reverse implication from such a theory
by pointing out that flights above the minimum cruising heights set
forth by the C.A.A. cannot possibly be considered actionable no matter
what damage may have been caused.'0
(4) The landowner owns the air space up as far as it is possible for
him to take effective possession.
(5) The landowner owns the air space up as far as he actually
occupies or of which it is probable that he will ever take effective
possession.
The distinction between (4), which appears to have been followed
by a number of state courts," and (5), which was the one pronounced
by the Supreme Court in the Causby case,12 is the difference between
6 11 U.L.A. 157 (Supp. 1947) "Section 3. Ownership of Space. The owner-
ship of the space above the lands and waters of this state is declared to be vested
in the several owners of the surface beneath, subject to the right of flight de-
scribed in Section 4." Section 4 authorizes flights unless so low as to interfere
with existing use of property or as to be eminently dangerous to persons or prop-
erty. This statute in 1947 was in force in 22 states. The concept of ownership
of air space therein has since been repudiated by its original sponsors, the Avia-
tion Committee of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American
Bar Association's Committee on Aeronautical Law. Rhyne, note 4 above, pages
109 to 112.
7 Section 194.
8Reaver v. Martin Theatres of Florida, 46 So. (2d) 896 (Fla. Sup. Ct.
(1951); Vanderslice v. Shaun, 26 Del.Ch. 225, 27 A (2d) 87 (1942); Guith v.
Consumers Power Co. 36 F. (2d) 21 (D.C. Mich. 1940).
9 Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385 (1930);
Burnham v. Beverly Airways, Inc. 311 Mass. 628, 42 N.E. (2d) 575 (1942). Thus
in the Burnham Case, as noted in note 3 above, flights below 500 feet were con-
sidered technical trespasses and $1. in damages awarded.10 Boskovich v. U.S.A., 3 Avi. 17, 252 D.C. Utah 1950). Court dismissed
Plaintiff's complaint alleging damage through fright of his chickens because of
the noise of an Army formation flight at 1000 feet. Partial grounds for the
dismissed case was that the flight was "lawful."
11 Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 41 F 2d 929 (D.C. Ohio 1930), modi-
fied 55 F 2d 201 (C.C.A. 6th 1931). Delta Air. Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20
S.E. (2d) 245 (1942); Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S.E. 817
(1934); Dutton v. Mendocino County 1949 USAvR 1 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Mendocino
County 1948).
12 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 66 S. Ct. 1092, 90 L. Ed. 1206
(1946). The case was remanded to the Court of Claims for the assessment of
damages. The Government's planes had utilized a glide angle of 83 feet over
Plaintiff's property. The Court of Claims held there was a "taking" up to 365
feet which was 300 feet overthe tallest object on Plaintiff's property. The court
concluded:
"The result of this, we recognize, is to vest in the United States the right
to fly its airplanes :at any altitude above 365 feet with impunity. This, of
course, would prevent the plaintiffs from erecting on their property a build-
ing of the height of the Empire State Building or any structure more than 365
feet in height. Were this property located at a place where there was any likeli-
hood that such a structure would be erected on it, the defendant without paying
for it would have no right to the airspace above the property to an altitude so
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air space which could conceivably be used if, for example, the 'land-
owner wanted to demolish his house and build another (Empire State
Building) or which he is actually using or probably ever will use. 12
These two theories are predominant today but there has been no final
agreement as to which is to be followed.
Returning to the main question which this section seeks to ex-
plore - the manner in which courts balance the conflicting interests
of airports and the landowner, it was earlier noted that the courts at-
tempted to balance the equities involved. 13 There is one legal prin-
ciple which seems well settled however; an airport, flying school, or
landing field is not a nuisance per se, but it may become such from
the manner of its construction or operation, or because of its unsuitable
low as would prevent such a structure from being erected. But here there was
but the most remote possibility that plaintiffs would ever put this property to
such a use. The flight of airplanes above their property at a greater altitude
than 365 feet in no way interfered with their possession and enjoyment of it or
with any use they might conceivably make of it. In such case we do not think
the defendant should have to pay for the right to fly its airplanes above this
altitude. Stated otherwise, if defendant flew its airplanes at 366 feet or more
above this property, we do not think it can be said that it has imposed a servi-
tude upon it." (Causby v. United States, 1947 USAvR 513, 516 (U.S. Ct. Cls.
1948).
12a Congress appears to have taken this view for in giving the Administrator
power to condemn easements in the airspace in case of Federally owned and
operated airports, it stated that "probable future use of the undeilying land"
may be considered, 49 USC 452.
18 Perhaps the best way to explain the application of this principle would be
to cite from a typical, well reasoned case. Antonik v. Chamberlain, 3 Avi. 14,500
(Ct. of Appeals, 9th Jud. District, Ohio, 1947).
S... the principle that every person is entitled to use his property for any
purpose that he sees fit, and the opposing principle that everyone is bound
to use his property in such a manner as not to injure the property or rights
of his neighbor. For generations, courts, in their tasks of judging, have
ruled on these extremes according to the wisdom of the day, and many have
recognized that the contemporary view of public policy shifts from genera-
tion to generation.
"In our business of judging in this case, while sitting as a court of equity,
we must not only weigh the conflict of interests between the airport owner
and the nearby landowners, but we must further recognize the public policy
of the generation in which we live. We must recognize that the establish-
ment of an airport of the kind contemplated is of great concern to the pub-
lic, and if such an airport is abated, or its establishment prevented, the
consequences will be not only a serious injury to the owner of the port prop-
erty but may be a serious loss of a valuable asset to the entire community.
"The necessities of a social state, especially in a great industrial community,
compel the rule that no one has absolute freedom in the use of his property,
because he must be restrained in his use by the existence of equal rights in
his neighbor to the use of his property. This rule has sometimes been er-
roneously interpreted as a prohibition of all use of one's property which
annoys or disturbs his neighbor in the enjoyment of his property. The
question for decision is not simply whether the neighbor is annoyed or dis-
turbed, but is whether there is an injury to a legal right of the neighbor.
The law of private nuisance is a law of degree; it generally turns on the
factual question whether the use to which the property is put is a reasonable
use under the circumstances, and whether there is an appreciable, substan-
tial, tangible injury resulting in actual, material, physical discomfort, and
not merely a tendency to injure. It must be real and not fanciful or imag-
inary, or such as results merely in a trifling annoyance, inconvenience, or
discomfort." 39 Am. Jur., Nuisances, Sec. 30.
"All systems of jurisprudence recognize the requirement of compromise in
the social state. Members of society must submit to annoyances consequent
upon the reasonable use of property. 'Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas'
is an old maxim which has a broad application. If such rule were held to
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location.14  Beyond this premise, however, the judicial balance of in-
terests mentioned above comes into play.
The usual complaints by landowners can be grouped together as
(a) noise, dust, glaring lights, (b) flights at low altitude, and (c) ap-
prehension of danger. The usual defense by airport owners is that
they have a right to operate their enterprises which are charged with
the public interest and that whatever inconveniences are suffered by
adjacent landowners are neglible when balanced against these interests.
Thus a court may, on the one hand, consider that noise and dust,
though a source of irritation and annoyance, is not such as to be harm-
ful to the health or comfort of ordinary people,15 or, on the other hand
feel that the noise would be so deafening as to interrupt the proper
conduct of a school,' 6 or summer camp, 17 or indeed, simply prevent
the landowners' peaceful enjoyment of their land."
Repeated flights at a low altitude which may be dangerous to the
mean that one must never use his own property in such a way as to do any
injury to his neighbor or his property, it could not be enforced in civilized
society. People who live in organized communities must of necessity suffer
some damage, inconvenience and annoyance from their neighbors. For these
annoyances, inconveniences and damages, they are generally compensated
by the advantages incident to living in a civilized state.
"[Speculative nature of anticipated damage]
"3. A brief summary of the contentions of the plaintiffs is that the de-
fendants, if permitted to build and operate the airport, will inflict irrepara-
ble damage because of (1) noise, (2) dust, (3) attraction of crowds, who
will trespass upon their premises, (4) annoyance in the peaceful enjoyment
of their homes, (5) fright and fear of physical harm from low flying and
the crashing of planes, (6) depreciation of property values.
"The long record of testimony and exhibits is replete with evidence offered
in support of and against these claims. It is impossible, from this maze of
evidence, to state with any degree of accuracy just what legal injury to the
plaintiffs the evidence proves. To find that irreparable damage will follow
from the operation of the port would be but guess and speculation. And
to find that the use as an airport of approximately 450 acres of land beyond
the city limits and away from the closely-built-up and congested part of the
city is an unreasonable use of the land, would, we think, under the circum-
stances of this case, obstruct the development of aviation, as a legitimate
and necessary industry, to an unreasonable extent.
"Undoubtedly the plaintiffs will experience some discomfort, but that is one
of the incidents or results of residing in a heavily-populated, highly indus-
trialized state. It is an incident of living in an age of progress, in which
there are erected huge rubber factories, with their accompanying smells
and noises; in which the streets and highways are used by great, noisy
trucks for transportation; in which commercial airliners ply the skies con-
tinuously, for the speedy transport of persons and freight; and in which
thousands of various industries throughout the cities and countryside con-
taminate and defile the former natural beauty, peacefulness and quiet of
the vicinage."
14 6 Rev. Am. Jur., Aviation, par. 29, 140 ALR 1362; 90 L. Ed. 1222; and
numerous cases cited therein.
15 Batcheller v. Com. 176 Va. 109, 10 S.E. (2d) 529 (1940). Smith v. New
England Aircraft Co. 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385 (1930).
16 Warren Twp. School Dist. v. Detroit 308 Mich. 460, 14 N.W. (2d) 134
(1944).
17 Mohican & Reena v. Tobiasz 1938 USAvR 1 (Mass. Sup. Ct. 1938).
Is Thrasher v. Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S.E. 817 (1934) ; Swetland v. Cur-
t sa Airports Corp. 55 F. 2d 201, (C.C.A. 6th 1932). It is interesting to note,
however, that a later opinion involving the same airport as was the subject of
the Swetland case indicated that public interest factors occasioned by public
ownership of the property may well be grounds for a shift in balance in favor
of the airport over the adjacent landowners. Swetland v. Curtiss 1950 USAvR
270 (D.C. Ohio 1950) aff'd. 188 F. (2d) 841 (C.C.A. 6th 1951).
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health and life of the owner, or constitute an unreasonable annoyance
to the landowner are actionable wrongs. I9
Interestingly enough, however, it does not appear that the mere
apprehension of injury from the falling of planes is sufficient to author-
ize an injunction against aerial navigation over the property of a
neighboring landowner.20
On the other side of the picture, the courts have recognized that
"property owners, to a reasonable degree, must yield their desired
privacy to the general welfare which is contributed to by the opera-
tions of legitimate businesses," 21 such as air transportation. Further
than that, however, courts are increasingly recognizing the public in-
terest involved in the operation of an airport, particularly the larger
ones, and wish to hamper their operations as little as possible.22
In summary, therefore, it can be stated again that as between land-
owner versus airport the courts have considered their function as one
of balancing equities drawn from the proven facts of each individual
case. In some cases, particularly earlier ones, they went so far as to
close down some airports completely by enjoining them as a nuisance.2 &
In more recent decisions, however, indicating a more sympathetic view
towards airport operations, they have sought to avoid going to such,
lengths and have often issued injunctions requiring take offs and land-
ings to be made above a certain altitude over the objecting land-
owners' property.2 4 Many recent cases refuse to issue any injunction
at all on facts where earlier decisions would surely have done so. 2 5
19 Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport 84 F. 2d 755 (C.C.A. 9th 1936); Delta
Air Corp. v. Kersey 193 Ga. 862, 20 S.E. 2d 245 (1942); Vanderslice v. Shaun
27 A (2d) 87 (Del. Ct. Chan. 1942).
20 Thrasher v. Atlanta 178 Ga. 514, 173 S.E. 817 (1934) ; Batcheller v. Com.
176 Va. 109, 10 S.E. 2d 529 (1940). It must be noted, however, that if flights
are so low as to cause fear, grounds for action can probably be found in terms
of other factors such as noise or low flying.
21 Anderson v. Souza 1951 USAvR 334, 346 (D.C. of Appeals, 3rd District,
Cal. 1951).
22Kuntz v. Werner Flying Service Inc. 257 Wis. 405, 43 N.W. (2d) 476
(1950); Reynolds v. Wilson, 2 Avi. 14,863 (Ct. Com. P1. Lawrence County, Pa.
1949).
23Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp. 55 F. (2d) 201 (C.C.A. 6th 1931);
Gay v. Taylor 19 Pa. Dist. & Co. Rep. 31, 1934 USAvR 146, Ct. of Com. P1.
Pa. Chester Co. 1932).
24Anderson v. Souza 1951 USAvR 334 (D.C. of Appeals, 3rd District, Cal.
1951); Reynolds v. Wilson, 2 Avi. 14,863 (Ct. Com. P1. Pa. Lawrence Co. 1949);
Maitland v. Twin City Aviation Corp. 254 Wis. 541, 37 N.W. (2d) 74 (1949)
(injunction limited to 500 feet) ; Hyde v. Somerset, 1 N.J. Super. 346, 61 A (2d)
645 (1948) (injunction requiring certain flight patterns). Dlugos v. United Air-
lines, 53 Pa. D.&C. 402, 1947 USAvR 392 (Ct. Com. P1. Pa. Lehigh Co. 1947)
(injunction limited to 100 feet) ; Vanderslice v. Shaun, 26 Del.Ch. 225, 27 A (2d)
87 (1942) (injunction limited to 100 feet); Burnham v. Beverly Airways, 311
Mass. 628, 42 N.E. (2d) 575 (1942) (injunction limited to 500 feet) ; Mohican &
Reena, Inc. v. Tobiasz, 1938 USAvR 1 (Mass. Hampden Co. Sup. Ct. 1938) (in-
junction limited to a height of 1000 feet within 500 feet of summer camp);
Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S.E. 817 (1934) (injunction against
spread of dust in unreasonable quantities).
25Crew v. Gallagher, 58 D.&C. 226, 1948 USAvR 167 (Pa. Sup. Ct. E.D.
1948); Kuntz v. Werner Flying Service, Inc., 257 Wis. 405, 43 N.W. (2d) 476'
(1950). The Kuntz case stated that the damage was not sufficiently irreparable
to warrant an injunction, but if specific damage did develop in the future, the,
Plaintiff could seek relief claiming damage in dollar amount. This seems to be
a recent trend.
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The reverse side of the coin involves suits by airports against land-
owners alleging activities which hamper airport operation. If the al-
leged obstruction is clearly a "spite" construction - e.g. tall poles of
no value to the landowner except as they will prevent airplanes from
flying low - the courts have not been sympathetic for it appears that
the landowner is trying to force the airport to purchase his property.2
They have either required the removal of such obstructions or limited
their height. Involved in each decision, of course, is a basic analysis
of the rights of the landowner as discussed above and the same "bal-
ance" of equities takes place.
When the obstruction is a legitimate one,27 such as power lines28
or a water tower 29 the courts have been more sympathetic to the land-
owner, particularly if the airport involved is a "private" airport not
involving extensive interstate commerce.80 If there is conflicting tes-
timony as to whether the construction is really an obstruction, 1 or
if the airport was negligent in not protesting the building until after
it had been completed, 82 the landowner's side of the scale is addi-
tionally weighted. Finally, if it really appears that the construction
is an obstruction, but a legitimate one, in the absence of prior enacted
zoning laws the court will hold that to require the landowner to re-
move. the obstruction would be a "taking" of property which can only
be accomplished through the legitimate use of the power of eminent
domain with due compensation to the landowner.88
STATE AND MUNICIPAL AUTHORITY OVER AIRPORTS
In the introduction to this article three questions were posed in
connection with State and Municipal authority as they affect the con-
flicting claims of airports and landowners.
The first of these questions concerned the limits in the state or
municipal power of eminent domain to secure land upon which to
construct airports.
The question of whether a state, municipality, or public body
created by a state has the authority to acquire, maintain, and operate
public airports is a matter of the interpretation of specific state statutes
26 Liles v. Jarigan, 1950 USAvR 90 (Chan. Ct. Roane Co. Tenn. 1949);
United Airports of Cal. Ltd. v. Hinman 1940 USAvR 1 (D.C. Cal. 1939); Corn-
monwealth v. Bestecki 1937 USAvR 1 (Ct. Com. Pl., Dauphin Co., Pa. (1937);
City of Iowa City v. Tucker 1936 USAvR 10 (Dist. Ct. Johnson Co. Iowa, 1935).
27 Reaver v. Martin 46 So. (2d) 896 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1951) (drive-in theatre) ;
Air Terminal Properties v. City of New York 16 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 629 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1939) (held trees did not interfere with airport's operation).
28 Guith v. Consumers Power Co. 36 F. (2d) 21 (D.C. Mich. 1940) ; Capitol
Airways, Inc. v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co. 215 Ind. 462, 18 N.E. (2d) 776
(1939). In Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Com., 235 C.C.H. para.
1700 (Pa. Sp. Ct. 1941) the court upheld an order of the Pa. Pub. Util. Com. in
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or constitutions.8 a  In early years taxpayers unsuccessfully sought to
restrain the use of public funds for the acquisition of airports on the
grounds that an airport was not a "public purpose" or "public utility"
within the meaning of appropriate enabling legislation.3 5
Having passed this hurdle, the next obstacle was relatively simple.
Eminent domain is a power which naturally flows from the police
power possessed by the several states and its exercise is one which, as
stated in state constitutions, may be exercised when property is needed
for the "public use." It was not long before the courts had sustained
the action of states and municipalities and of public corporations and
airline companies if properly authorized under state legislation, in
utilizing the power of eminent domain to acquire land to construct
an airport as one for "public use." 86  The authority of the state to
emplov the power of eminent domain to acquire land for an airport
to be constructed by the Federal Government has also been sustained.87
A second question which arises in relation to state regulation, is
whether the fact that an airport was constructed, maintained, or oper-
ated by a state or other public body through proper enabling legisla-
tion, or is licensed by a state regulatory agency, lessens the rights iwhich
the landowner adjacent to an airport has in the enjoyment of his prop-
erty. Does this fact affect the balance of conflicting claims discussed
in the First Section of this article?
The mere fact that an airport has received a license from a state
aeronautical commission or was built from public funds does not give-
it the authority to commit nuisances that it could not otherwise com-
mit.8
On the other hand, although never controlling, this fact does add
.weight to the airport side of the scale in weighing conflicting claims
of airport and landowners because it strengthens the "public interest"
factor.3 9  A privately owned airport, however, particularly where it is
84 Rhyne, note 4 above, Chapter 1 and cases cited therein.3 5 Idem, pages 20 to 31. 6 rev. Am. Jur., Aviation para. 31.
36 Rhyne, note 4 above, Chapter 2, and cases cited therein; 185 ALR 756.
In State ex rel Helsel v. Commrs. of Cuyahoga Co. 1948 USAvR 18 (Ct. of Ap-
peals, Cuyahoga Co. Ohio 1948) it was held that a county had the authority to
utilize the power of eminent domain to acquire land for an airport in spite of
the fact that the area had been locally zoned as a residential area.
It is further to be noted that the utilization of the power of eminent domain
does not always require that land adjacent to an airport be purchased in its
entirety. Only an easement need be purchased. e.g. Okla. Section 13 of Airport
Zoning Act of 1943, 1946 USAvR 221. In Friendship Cemetery v. Baltimore, 3
Avi. 17,289 (Cir. Ct., Anne Arundel County, Md. 1950) the court declared that
the airport was not required to acquire the cemetery because the enjoyment of
the property was not decreased by an aircraft approach thereover. It held that
the cemetery could maintain an action in trespass to receive compensation for
any specific damage done to the cemetery by workmen working on the nearby
airport. Today about half of the states authorize the use of eminent domain as
a means to compensate for damage to property as well as for "taking."
87 Rhyne, note 4 above, pages 36 to 39.
88 Hyde v. Somerset, 1 N.J. Super. 346, 61 A (2d) 645 (1948); Delta Air
Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20 S.E. (2d) 245 (1942); Gay v. Taylor, 19 Pd.
D & C 81 1934 USAvR 146 (Ct. of Com. Pl., Pa. Chester Co. 1932).
89 Swetland v. Curtiss, 1950 USAvR 270 (D.C. Ohio 1950) aff'd. 188 F. (2d)
841, 151 USAvR 227 (C.C.A. 6th 1951).
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a small one, is treated just like any other ordinary business enterprise
even though it may be available to the general public. Its value to
the "general welfare" is the same as any business enterprise would be.4
0
An airport which is owned by a state or other public body, how-
ever, is definitely in the "public interest." Indeed, as pointed out
above, its original acquisition of the land, both through the use of
public funds and possibly eminent domain, had to have a "public"
character. 41  But it is clear that the fact that the airport itself was
deemed in the public interest does not mean that the individuals or
corporations acting primarily for their own benefit, although the pub-
lic benefit as well, using the airport, may deprive the adjacent land-
owners of their enjoyment of property.42 It would further appear
that the political subdivision of the state which operates the airport
is not immune from liability by way or damage or injunction, for a
legislature cannot confer immunity for action for a private nuisance
of such a character as to amount in effect to the taking of private prop-
erty for public use. 48
The third question, and perhaps the most important one relating
to states, concerns that of zoning. An airport costing many millions
of dollars can soon be worthless if the surrounding area is allowed to
be built up so as to obstruct approaches thereto.
The power to zone as a general matter, although a relatively recent
development, is an undisputed exercise of a state's police power. 44 As
far as a municipality or other public body is concerned, however, it
must receive specific authority from state legislation in order to do so.
For example, the City of Newark sought to zone the area around the
Newark airport some time ago but was prevented by court action on
the grounds that the state had not specifically authorized the City of
Newark to do so.45 Almost all states now have a statute (most of which
are similar to the model statute drafted by the National Institute of
Municipal Law Officers of the C.A.A.) authorizing the adoption of
zoning ordinances. 0
The power to zone, however, is a limited one. It must not be un-
reasonable or open to charges of discrimination or uncertainty. 47 Of
40 Anderson v. Souza, 1951 USAvR 335 (Dist. Ct. of Appeals, 3rd Dist., Cal.
1951; Roosevelt Field v. Town of North Hempsted, 88 F. Supp. 177 (D.C. N.Y.
1950).
41 See notes 35 and 86 above.
42 e.g. Hyde v. Somerset, 1 N.J. Super. 346, 61 A (2d) 645 (1948).
43 State ex rel Helsel v. Commrs. of Cuyahoga Co. 1948 USAvR 18 (Ct. of
Appeals, Cuyahoga Co. Ohio 1948); Thrasher v. Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S.E.
817 (1934). But see Stocker v. Nashville, 174 Tenn. 483, 126 S.W. (2d) 339(1939).
'4 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114, 71
L. Ed. 303 (1926); f8 Am. Jur. Zoning, para. 18.
45 Yara Engineering Corp. v. City of Newark, 132 N.J. L. 370, 40 A (2d)
559 (Sup. Ct., N.J. 1945) ; Rice v. City of Newark, 132 N.J. L. 387, 40 A (2d)
561 (1945).
40 Rhyne, note 4 above, pages 171 to 173; Rhyne, Airport Legislation and
Decisions, 14 J. of Air Law and Com. 289, 296 (1947).
47 58 Am. Jur. Zoning, paras. 20 to 24.
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primary importance, however, is the fact that it cannot go beyond the
line of regulation and become an actual taking of property without
just compensation. Zoning, of course, as with any other exercise of
police power, takes away some of the rights incident to the property
in the public interest.48 If zoning attempts to deprive the landowner
of a substantial interest in his property under the pretense of regula-
tion, however, and results in a substantial diminution of property val-
ues, then it becomes a "taking" without due process of law, and if the
state or public body desires the property it must utilize its power of
eminent domain.49 The facts of the particular case determine when this
line is reached.50 One case suggests that the "line" may be farther in
a matter such as public health than when the question is zoning an
area around a private airport.5 Another case has voided a zoning
ordinance limiting the erection of any building within 100 feet of an
airport. 52  It also would appear evident that any state action setting
a "navigable zone" for aircraft approaching an airfield could equally
be considered a "taking" which could only be accomplished through
eminent domain if, in fact, it resulted in a substantial diminution of
value of the land.53
Accordingly, zoning is best when it has no retroactive effect, and
only limits development which might occur in the future as opposed
to development which already exists or is on its way. The C.A.A. in
its administration of the Federal Airport Act has quite rightly and
wisely required adequate zoning provisions prior to its approval of
any airport project. However, zoning insofar as it applies to already
populated areas immediately raises the problem of whether it is a
-'taking."
48 Rhyne, note 4 above, pages 177 to 179.
49 State ex rel Helsel v. Commrs. of Cuyahoga Co., 1948 USAvR 18 (Ct. of
Appeals, Cuyahoga Co. Ohio, 1948); Dutton v. Mendocino County, 1949 USAvR
1 (Sup. Ct., Mendocino Co., Cal. 1948) ; Mutual Chemical Co. of America v. Bal-
timore, 1939 USAvR 11 (Balto. City, Cir. Ct. No. 2, Md. 1939).
50 In discussing the line where regulation under the police power becomes
-a "taking," Mr. Justice Holmes in Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413,
43 S. Ct. 158, 67 L. Ed. 322 (1922), said:
"Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to prop-
erty could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the
general law. As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied
limitation and must yield to the police power. But obviously the implied
limitation must have its limits or the contract and due process clauses are
gone. One fact for consideration in determining such limits is the extent
of the diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most, if not all
cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sus-
tain the act. So the question depends upon the particular facts. The great-
est weight is given to the judgment of the Legislature, but it always is open
to interested parties to contend that the Legislature has gone beyond its
constitutional power."
51 Dutton v. Mendocino County, 1949 USAvR 1 (Sup. Ct., Mendocino Co.,
Cal. 1948).
52Mutual Chemical Co. of America v. Baltimore, 1939 USAvR 11 (Balto.
City, Cir. Ct. No. 2, Md. 1939).58 Gay v. Taylor, 19 Pa. D & C 31, 1934 USAvR 146 (Ct. of Coin. Pl., Pa.,
Chester Co. 1932). See: United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 166 S. Ct. 1062,
90 L. Ed. 1206 (1946).
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THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S POWER OVER AIRPORTS
The question of the scope of the authority of the Federal Govern-
ment over airports is one of particular importance and yet, unfortu-
nately, the one which has been least considered by the courts.
The three powers of the Federal Government which are of primary
interest are zoning, regulation of airport approaches, and regulation
of airports themselves - particularly their closing. Each of these will
be considered in detail below, and will, of necessity, involve a discus-
sion of the two basic issues of this article: (1) the conflict of State and
Federal jurisdiction; and (2) the conflict between the regulation of
air navigation for the public good and the rights of landowners adja-
cent to airports and/or the airport owners themselves.
The Power to Zone
History. There is no existing legislation which would authorize
the Federal Government to zone areas around airports. 54 In January
of 1943 a bill was introduced into Congress (H.R. 1012) which pro-
vided the Civil Aeronautics Board with authority to set up a nation-
wide program of zoning and with power in case the States failed to act
in accordance therewith. The bill was never reported out because of
the controversial issues contained therein. 55
Accordingly, whatever airport zoning action has been taken, has
been accomplished by the States or their appropriately authorized
subdivisions. The C.A.A. has indirectly assisted in this development
by requiring prior to approval of any project under the Federal Air-
port Act that proper zoning measures be taken, and by working out
in conjunction with the National Institute of Municipal Law Offices
a model zoning act which has now been enacted by more than thirty-
five States and the Territories of Alaska and Hawaii, and by governing
bodies of a number of State subdivisions. The lack of uniformity in
zoning by local authorities, as well as the "gaps" where no zoning
authority exists at all, tends to show the need for the adoption of a
Federal zoning program with authority to enforce such a program in
areas where State action is not forthcoming.
54 Thus the C.A.A. at this time has no power to limit the height of man-
made or natural structures around an airport, although its regulations do require
that notice of any possible obstructions to air navigation be given. See discussion
in Roosevelt Field v. Town of North Hempsted, 88 F. Supp. 177 (D.C. N.Y. 1950).
s5 An excellent memorandum prepared by Mr. Howard Westwood appears
at page 249 of the Report of the Hearings held on this bill before the Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce (H.R. 1012, 78th Cong., 1st Sess.). Mr.
Westwood concludes that Congress had the Constitutional authority to provide
for the limitation of the height of structures and natural objects near an airport
as set forth in the proposed bill. Means by which landowners would be compen-
sated if required to alter structures on their lands were included in the bill but
it Was silent as to the possible compensation of landowners, the value of whose
land was reduced by the Zoning regulations. Mr. Westwood thought that
this silence might result in a Constitutional defect in the proposed bill-a con-
clusion with which we agree.
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Legal Principles. There are two basic issues involved in a dis-
cussion of the Federal power to zone areas around airports: What is the
scope of the power to zone? When does its exercise require compen-
sation paid to private landowners?
(a) The Scope of the Power to Zone. The question of the extent
of the power of the Federal Government to zone has never been judi-
cially determined. 58
The power to zone, however, is not a power per se but, like emi-
nent domain, is a collateral power which may be used to effectuate a
basic authority. Accordingly, just as the states have the power to zone
as a collateral power in the exercise of their police power to protect
the health and welfare of their citizens, as pointed out above, we be-
lieve that the Federal Government has the power to zone in connection
with its authority to regulate interstate commerce, 57 and its postal and
war powers. The question is whether this power extends not only to
vertical zoning to prevent air approach obstructions, but also to zoning
land uses in an azimuth area at either end of an airport runway.
We believe that unquestionably the Federal Government has the
authority, through appropriate legislation, to control the height of
structures or natural objects in an area surrounding an airport to pro-
tect interstate air navigation. It has been held that the Federal Gov-
ernment could utilize the power of eminent domain to acquire land
for an airport since the construction of airports is a legitimate exercise
of the Constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce.5 8 It
would follow that it has the power to zone to protect approaches to
the airport, or otherwise, its power to build airports is rendered in-
effectual. Similarly if the Federal Government has the power to con-
56 The Federal Government has never had occasion to engage in airport
zoning. Usually in the past when it wanted the use of airspace as an approach
to an airport, it either bought the underlying land outright, "took" it and then
paid for it upon a suit alleging a deprivation of property without just compen-
sation, United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), or, more recently, applied
the use of eminent domain. Jasper v. Sawyer, 100 F. Supp. 421 (D.C. D.C. 1951);
U.S.A. v. 1.01 Acres of Land in the District of Columbia, 1948 USAvR 22 (D.C.
D.C. 1948). As has been noted above, however, it indirectly assisted the states
in airport zoning activities.
Indeed, the Federal Government has not had occasion to "zone" (as that term
is commonly understood by the layman] in any field to any extent in the past.
Congress has authorized the National Capital Park and Planning Commission
to do so in relation to the District of Columbia; 40 U.S.C. 71, and it has author-
ized the Secretary of Agriculture to zone, in "cooperation with the States con-
cerned," areas adjacent to the Mexican border to prohibit the growing of cotton
in order to stop the spread of the pink bollworm from Mexico. 7 U.S.C. 145.
As a matter of fact, however, areas in navigable waters have been "zoned"
as quarantine areas etc. as have areas in the airspace over atomic plants. (See
note 64 below). There is no substantial difference between zoning of this type
and the designation of primary activities in various municipal areas.
57 Although reference is only made to the power of Congress to regulate
"interstate" commerce hereafter, the power to regulate "foreign" and "overseas"
commerce is equally applicable.
58 A decision last year in the District Court of the District of Columbia,
Jasper v. Sawyer, 100 F. Supp. 421 (D.C. D.C. 1951), had this to say in regard
-to the proposed Burke Airport in Virginia:
"It is settled by decisions of the Supreme Court, beyond peradventure of
doubt, that the U.S. is clothed with the power of eminent domain. Even
though the power was not expressly conferred by the Constitution, the power
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trol interstate air navigation through the promulgation of rules of
flight, etc.,59 its power to zone around existing airports not owned by
the Federal Government would seem equally to follow because rules
of flights will not foster the development of interstate air navigation if
obstructions can prevent the operation of such rules. Recent decisions
of the Supreme Court which have recognized the broad sweep of the
power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce would support this
conclusion."0 Vertical zoning once authorized by Congress and ef-
fectuated by a federal administrative agency, would supersede and pre-
clude state zoning of the same area. 1
A much more difficult problem, however, concerns the power to
zone an area surrounding an airport in order to prevent it from de-
veloping into a residential area whose citizens may seek to enjoin the
operation of the airport at some future time as a "nuisance" - e.g.
the noise and glaring lights of the landing aircraft destroys the value
of their property as a residence. This power is not as clearly connected
with the regulation of interstate commerce as the restriction of the
heights of buildings,6 2 except in an anticipatory manner. However,
as noted above, the Supreme Court has gone to such extremes in vali-
is implied and is incidental to carrying out other powers. Kohl v. United
States, 91 U.S. 367, 23 L. Ed. 449. The right of eminent domain which
exists in the federal government may be exercised by it within the states
so far as it is necessary to the enjoyment of the powers conferred upon it
by the Constitution. Under its power to regulate commerce between the
states as well as foreign commerce, it is fundamental that Congress may
construct, maintain, and operate instrumentalities of such commerce ...
Since the early days of the Republic, acting under this power as well as the
power to maintain post offices and post roads, Congress constructed such
instrumentalities of commerce as roads, highways, bridges, lighthouses and
the like.
"It is clear that in the light of modern developments, an airport is an instru-
mentality of both foreign and interstate commerce."
59 See Section 601 (a) (7) of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, as amended
cited in the text below. See, also, the comprehensive regulatory power granted
to the Board and the Administrator in the Air Commerce Act of 1926 and the
Civil Aeronautics Act itself. 49 U.S.C. 171 et. seq.; 49 U.S.C. 401 et. seq.
60 Mr. Chief Justice Stone made the broad statement in United States v.
Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100, 115, 61 S. Ct. 451, 85 L. Ed. 609 (1941) that
"Whatever their motive and purpose, regulations of commerce which do not
infringe some constitutional prohibition are within the plenary power conferred
on Congress by the Commerce Clause." See, also, N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615, 81 L. Ed. 893 (1937); United States v.
Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 62 S. Ct. 523, 86 L. Ed. 726 (1942).
61 The power to zone is a power jointly possessed by the federal and state
governments-the one primarily pursuant to its power to regulate interstate
commerce and the other pursuant to its police power. The state governments
are free to utilize this power until the federal government acts. If legislation
which the Congress validly passes on this subject sufficiently "occupies the field,"
all state action is superseded or thereafter prevented.
62 Protection of the health and safety of the residents near to an airport is
an area within the orbit of the states' police powers. Unless zoning by the Fed-
eral Government directed to the protection of such residents can be geared to a
specific constitutional authority, such as the regulation of interstate commerce,
it would be held as a usurpation of the States' police powers. It is doubtful
whether the Constitutional authority to tax and spend for the "general welfare"
would in and of itself be sufficient to support such legislation although there is
some language in recent decisions of the Supreme Court which would support
this view.
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dating Congressional legislation pursuant to the power of Congress
to regulate commerce, that we believe there is a very good chance
zoning power of this nature would be upheld. Certainly, if any anal-
ogy to the navigable waters cases can be followed which have held that
all riparian owners hold their property subject to a "servitude" in the
United States for regulatory purposes and without compensation for
damage thereto, such zoning power would be upheld. 3
Constitutional authority for a Federal Zoning Act can be suffi-
ciently established in the power to regulate interstate commerce with
the possible caveat of azimuth zoning referred to in the paragraph
immediately above. Additional authorization, however, can also be
found in the postal and war powers granted to Congress by the Con-
stitution which will be only briefly discussed.
Congress has the power to establish post roads and to make all laws
necessary and proper to carry this power into execution. Pursuant
thereto Congress has declared that "all air routes which are now or
hereafter may be in operation" are "post roads." (39 U.S.C. 481) It
would seem to be inherent in the power of Congress to establish
"post roads". to protect them through zoning legislation.
Congress also has the power to provide for the national defense.
A realistic analysis of this power, of course, does not limit it to periods
when an actual declaration of war is in effect. Zoning, of course, may
be one way in which the national defense may be provided for. Thus,
the Supreme Court in McKinley v. U.S., 249 U.S., 397 (1918) upheld
without question the section in the draft law of 1917 authorizing the
Secretary of War to zone areas around military encampments and by
regulation to prohibit prostitution therein. 4
(b) Zoning and compensation due private landowners. The
question involved in any exercise of the power to zone either by the
States now, or by the Federal Government at some future time, is when
does the diminution of property values become such that it is a taking
for which the property owner must be compensated under the Fifth
Amendment?
The analogous problem involving state regulations which have
been challenged as a deprivation of property without due process
pursuant to the 14th Amendment has been discussed above. Mr. Jus-
tice Holmes' effort in Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 200 U.S. 393 (1922)
to establish a criteria in determining when property values may be
diminished by regulation in the public interest with or without com-
pensation was there noted.61
In the field of Federal regulation the Supreme Court has often
declared that the utilization of the power to regulate interstate com-
63 See Memorandum of Mr. Westwood at note 55, above, for a full discussion
of these cases.
64 Although perhaps not considered "zoning" in its commonly understood
sense, Congress has authorized the creation of air space reservations over areas,
such as atomic plants, where deemed necessary in the national defense. P.L. 664,
81st Cong., 2nd Session (1950), 1950 USAvR 448.
e5 See footnote 50, above.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
mercee6 or to provide for the national defense 7 has a limitation in that
it cannot extend so far as to comprise a "taking."
Unfortunately, the question when an. application of the Federal
Zoning Statute would amount to a regulation in the public interest
which results in non-compensable diminution in property values and
when such a regulation amounts to a compensable "taking" depends
so much on the facts of the case, that it is impossible to spell out the
line clearly. The "balance" will always be one between public and
private interest as set forth in the many zoning cases brought up under
the 14th Amendment.6" The monetary value of the private invest-
ment is important - e.g., how much is the value of the property dimin-
ished - but this may be partially outweighed, but never completely
so, by the public interest involved.
The area in which zoning is much more apt to be a "taking" is, of
course, where there are established structures and businesses which
will be destroyed.69 It is less apt to be a "taking" when merely the
future use of property will be restricted.70 Or stated in a different way,
zoning regulations will undoubtedly affect landowners adjacent to
airports in such a manner that compensation will probably be neces-
sary. Landowners at a farther distance from an airport under an air-
craft approach pattern will be less directly affected and will probably
not have to be compensated, or at least not to the same extent.
This problem is so nebulous, however, that if any Federal Zoning
Act should include a provision whereby a landowner who alleges that
he has been aggrieved may have an opportunity to have his grievance
heard and adjudged. Otherwise the statute may be struck down as vio-
lative of the Fifth Amendment.71
6 Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. a12, 336, 13 S. Ct.
622, 37 L. Ed. 463 (1892).
67 This was, in essence, the problem involved in the Causby case, supra. See
footnote 12.
68 Mr. Westwood has suggested in his Memorandum at pages 266 and 267,
referred to in note 55 above, that the courts, when called upon to consider the
question of Federal Zoning, might seek their guide in the field of Federal regu-
lation over navigable waters rather than in zoning cases. In navigable waters
cases the doctrine has been developed "that one who owns riparian land holds
it subject to 'the servitude in respect of navigation' 'created in favor of the
Federal Government by the Constitution.' This doctrine originated in the
Court's desire to save the Federal Government harmless from liability to private
persons for damages caused by its development of water transportation." If
this analogy were applied, the Courts might go so far as to restrain the use of
lands near airports, to.inflict heavy damages on such land, and even to destroy
them altogether without compensation. Mr. Westwood hesitates to think that
this analogy would be applied to air transportation, however. Furthermore,
the implications of the Causby case, as applied in the Court of Claims on remand,
would not seem to be in sympathy therein. It is concluded, therefore, that it
is doubtful whether any court would ever apply the analogy of navigable waters
cases to develop a doctrine authorizing the Federal Government through zoning
authority to destroy property rights around airports.
69 But, see, Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 36 S. Ct. 143 (1915),
where the Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting the operation of brickyards in
residential districts which reduced the value of a brickyard from $800,000 to
$60,000.
70 See footnote 12, above.
71 See footnote 55, above.
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The Power to Regulate Airport Approaches
It is safe to say that it is indisputable that Congress has the author-
ity, pursuant to its power to regulate interstate commerce, to provide
for the regulation of airport approaches utilized by aircraft in inter-
state air navigation.72
It still has not been definitely decided to what extent Congress can
determine airport approach patterns for aircraft in intrastate air navi-
gation. A recent decision by a California court declared that "the
police power in intrastate air traffic is vested in the State and not in the
Federal Government except for the benefit of Army and Navy airports
and interstate air traffic under the interstate clause of the Constitu-
tion."73 On the other hand, lower Federal courts have been unani-
mous in declaring that if an intrastate flight "affects" interstate com-
merce, it is subject to the regulations of the C.A.A.7 4
72 The cases cited in note 74, as well as the implications of the Causby case,
compel this conclusion. See also the statement of Mr. Justice Jackson in North-
west Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303, 64 S. Ct. 950, 88 L. Ed. 1283 (1944),
where he said:
"Students of our legal evolution know how this Court interpreted the
commerce clause of the Constitution to lift navigable waters of the UnitedStates out of local controls and into the domain of Federal control ...
Air as an element in which to navigate is even more inevitably federalizedby the commerce clause than is navigable water. Local exactions and bar-
riers to free transit in the air would neutralize its indifference to space and
its conquest of time.
"Congress has recognized the national responsibility for regulating air
commerce. Federal control is intensive and exclusive. Planes do not wan-
der about the sky like vagrant clouds. They move only by Federal permis-
sion, subject to Federal inspection, in the hands of federally certified per-
sonnel and under an intricate system of Federal commands. . . . Its (air-
craft) privileges, rights and protection, so far as transit is concerned, it owes
to the Federal Government alone and not to any State government." (Italics
supplied.)
73 This view has been taken by the California courts: Parker v. James
Granger Inc., 4 Cal. (2d) 668, 52 P. (2d) 266 (1935), held that the State of Cali-fornia was vested with exclusive power to prescribe air traffic rules to govern
the operation of aircraft in flying in purely intrastate flights. In following thisdecision, Strather v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 211 P (2d) 624 (Dist. Ct. ofAppeals, 3rd Dist., 1949), a lower California court denied Plaintiff's claim that
the U.S. Government has exclusive sovereignty of the air throughout the U.S.
and may (through the C.A.A.) exercise control of air traffic whether it consists
of interstate or intrastate traffic. It conceded, under the Causby case, Federal
sovereignty in "higher airspace'? but not lower airspace over a private owner's
property, the use of which is intrastate and which is necessary and beneficial
to reasonable enjoyment of his land. It concluded, as cited above, that "police
power in intrastate air traffic is vested in the State and not in Federal Govern-
ment except for the benefit of Army and Navy airports and interstate air traffic
under the interstate clause of the Constitution." See also, Neiswonger v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 35 F. (2d) 761 (D.C. Ohio 1929).
The following courts, although not dealing specifically with C.A.A. regu-lations, have declared State sovereignty over intrastate air traffic: Erickson v.
King, 218 Minn. 98, 15 N.W. (2d) 201 (Minn. 1944); Aviation Credit Corp. v.Gardner, 174 Misc. 798, 22 N.Y. (2d) 37 (Sup. Ct., Erie County, N.Y.) (1940);
Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., Inc., 168 Wis. 436, 170 N.W. 285 (1930).
74 Rosenhan v. U.S., 131 F (2d) 932 (C.C.A. 10th 1942) (Aircraft in Intra-
state commerce may still "affect" interstate commerce to such an extent as to be
within the scope of aircraft registration requirements of Civil Aeronautics Act.)
U.S. v. Drumm, 55 F. Supp. 151 (D.C. Nov. 1944) (Regulation requiring pilot
certification and aircraft airworthiness certificate for local non-commercialflights sustained.) Court decisions have also sustained the C.A.A.'s position
that pursuant to Civil Aeronautics Act all aircraft, even though used only in
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When this issue comes before the Supreme Court for decision, it
is predicted that the very minimum it will hold is that the Federal
Government has the power to prescribe flight approaches to airports
which are substantially utilized by aircraft in interstate commerce.
This will leave the only field for State legislation to the determination
of flight approaches to very small private airports.
What has Congress done in effectuating its power over interstate
commerce in regard to the regulation of airport approaches?
Section 601 (a) (7) of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 is most
inclusive. It. authorizes the Board to promulgate "air traffic rules
governing the flight of, and for the navigation, protection ... of air-
craft, including rules as to safe altitudes of flight and rules for the
prevention of collisions between aircraft, and between aircraft and
land or water vehicles."
Pursuant to this Congressional mandate, it is clear that the Board
or the C.A.A. could determine traffic patterns into and out of any
airport in the country for any aircraft engaged in interstate commerce.
As noted above, we also believe that this authority would extend to
the determination of airport approaches for all aircraft utilizing an
airport which is substantially used by traffic consisting of interstate,
foreign, or overseas air transportation.
The power of the Board and the Administrator to regulate airport
approaches under the Civil Aeronautics Act has not been exhausted.
Under existing law it can prescribe air traffic patterns which will super-
sede all other air traffic patterns.7 5
The only limit to the exercise of this authority is, as in the case of
zoning, the point where regulation may so affect the value of the
property owners beneath the airport approach pattern that it consti-
tutes a compensable "taking." In such instances, eminent domain
must be utilized either to acquire title to the land below or, at least,
to acquire an easement through the airspace,7 6 or else a landowner
can secure an injunction closing or restricting the airport's operation. 7
intrastate commerce, are subject to title recordation: In Re Veterans' Air Ex-
press Co., 76 F. Supp. 684 (D.C. N.J. 1948); Blaloek v. Brown, 78 Ga. App. 537,
51 S.E. (2d) 610 (Ga. Ct. App. 1949).
It is to be noted that the cases cited herein and in note 73 above have been
limited to the safety aspects of air navigation. In regard to economic regula-
tion, the Civil Aeronautics Board appears to have voluntarily recognized that the
Civil Aeronautics Act does not go as far as it does in relation to safety matters.
7 Compare Section 601 (a) (7) of the Civil Aeronautics Act and Parts
60.18(c) and (d) of the Civil Air Regulations.
76 As is noted on page 30 below, the Administrator was granted the author-
ity in 1948 to exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire title to land needed
in the establishment of civil airways. Its authority to acquire easements in the
airspace is limited, however, to easements required in the case of air-navigation
facilities (including airports) owned by the United States and operated under
the direction of the Administrator. 49 U.S.C. 452. Accordingly, in order to
acquire easements in the airspace over non-federally owned. and operated air-
ports, additional legislation would appear to be needed.
77Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F. (2d) 201 (C.C.A. 6th, 1932).
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This analysis makes it unnecessary to consider the vexing question
of the ownership of the "airspace" and the right of transit there-
through.78  The Civil Aeronautics Act provides any citizen of the
United States a "public right of transit in air commerce through the
navigable airspace of the United States" and further defines "naviga-
ble airspace" as airspace above the minimum safe altitudes of flight
prescribed under the Act.79
In Part 60.17 of the Civil Air Regulations, the Board has set forth
certain "minimum safe altitudes." It is there noted that "except when
necessary for take-off or landing" no person shall operate an aircraft
below the specified altitudes. Thus certain altitudes are required over
"congested" areas while others are required over "other than congested
areas." It is doubtful, however, whether the Board in determining
these altitudes was considering the effect which they would have upon
the determination of' "navigable air space" as defined by the Act.
Rather, it would seem, the Board was simply concerned with safety as
evidenced by the fact that the "minimum safe altitude" in case of a
power failure is one which will allow an emergency landing without
undue hazard to persons or property on the surface. This situation
casts considerable confusion into the determination of what is "naviga-
ble air space."
As noted above, however, it is not necessary to resolve that ques-
tion. The Board presently has authority from Congress to regulate
and determine airport approaches, some of which it has delegated to
the C.A.A. Accordingly, all that needs be done is as follows: (a) the
best airport approach pattern for a particular airport can be deter-
mined; (b) if it appears that that airport approach pattern depre-
ciates property values of underlying landowners, the power of eminent
domain can then be exercised to acquire title to the land or an ease-
ment through the airspace. The Administrator presently has the au-
thority to acquire land needed for such purposes, and in the case of
air-navigation facilities (including airports) owned by the United
States and operated by the Administrator, to acquire easements through
or other interests in airspace at a price which takes into consideration
reasonable probable future use of the underlying land. 49 U.S.C. 452
(c). This statutory authority should be extended to authorize the
condemnation of easements through the airspace surrounding airports
not owned by the United States and operated by the Administrator.
The Power to Regulate the Use of Airports
There is no existing legislation which would authorize the C.A.B.
to exercise the kind of direct regulatory power over an airport which
would, for example, confer power to determine when it should be
78 See: Cooper, John C., State Sovereignty v. Federal Sovereignty of Naviga-
ble Airspace, 15 J. of Air L. & Com. 27 (1948); Dinu, Madeline C., State Sover-
eignty in the Navigable Airspace, 17 J. of Air Law & Com. 43 (1950).
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opened or closed. It appears that the Federal Government could,
through appropriate legislation establishing standards for regulatory
action appropriately related to Federal powers over interstate com-
merce, the postal service, and national defense occupy for itself the
power to regulate airports under those standards, including the power
to open and close them. Under such legislation, it is clear that the
Federal Government could act appropriately where buildings and
natural obstructions surrounding an airport endanger the airport's
approach patterns to such an extent as to endanger interstate air navi-
gation utilizing the airport. Whether such legislation could exclude
the exercise by States and municipalities of their police power with
respect to airports can only be finally determined by judicial decision.
However, any such Federal legislation should make it clear that the
intent of the legislation is for the Federal Government to occupy the
field exclusively so far as legally possible. The scope of the constitu-
tional authority which would embrace such power has been explored
above.
Airports are vital and integral parts of any interstate air transpor-
tation pattern which the Congress, through its power to regulate inter-
state commerce, can control.80 Accordingly, constitutional principles
appear to support congressional authority to authorize the C.A.B. or
the C.A.A. to grant "certificates" to airport operators whose standards
meet those prescribed as being consistent with the protection of inter-
state air transportation. Similarly, the power to suspend, to revoke,
and to regulate abandonment of those "certificates" could be placed
within the purview of the C.A.B.'s or CAA's authority on the grounds
that it is necessary to protect the interstate air transportation using
such airports.
Authors' Note: The above article was prepared in April of 1952. Since that
time an interesting decision has been published which confirms positions taken in
the article and further develops the legal analysis relating to certain of the
problems dealt with therein. In All American Airways, Inc. et al. v Village
of Cedarhurst, 3 Avi, Rep. 17,940 (D.C. E.D. N.Y. 1952) ten airlines utilizing
Idlewild Airport, the President of the Air Line Pilots Association, the Port of
New York Authority, and ten individual pilots brought an action against the
Village of Cedarhurst to secure a preliminary injunction against the enforce-
ment of an ordinance prohibiting, inter alia, the flight of aircraft over the village
at an altitude of less than 1000 feet. The defendants contended that the owner-
ship of the air space is vested in the owner of the surface soil beneath it citing
the Causby Case (discussed at length in the article above) and the implication
to be found in Section 302 (c) (2) of the Civil Aeronautics Act, 49 U.S.C. 452 (c)
(2), authorizing the administrator "to acquire by purchase, condemnation, lease,
or otherwise, . . . easements through or other interests in air space immediately
adjacent thereto . . ." The Court stated that the Causby Case was diametrically
opposed to the Defendant's contention and that Congress did not intend that the
Administrator "should be required to condemn or otherwise acquire the air space
adjacent to every plot of land over which planes under its supervision and control
would be obliged to fly in landing at or leaving an airport." (Underlining sup-
plied) The Court further stated that if that were the intent of Congress, then
the "remedy of the affected property owner is by an action for damage in the
Court of Claims . . ."
The Court then declared the ordinance unconstitutional and invalid. It
80 See: Jasper v. Sawyer, 100 F. Supp. 421 (D.C. 'D.C. 1951).
LAW OF AIRPORT OPERATIONS 278
pointed out that Congress passed the Civil Aeronautics Act pursuant to the
commerce power of the Constitution, that the Act provided a "'public right of
freedom of transit in air commerce through the navigable air space'" which is the
"'air space above the minimum altitudes of flight prescribed by regulations
issued under' said Act," and that the Board, acting under this authority, has
issued rules and regulations governing flight operations into Idlewild including
instances where the minimum altitude over Cedarhurst would be less than 1000
feet. Under these circumstances, the Court concluded, the ordinance of Cedar-
hurst was in conflict with the Civil Aeronautics Act and the rules and regula-
tions issued thereunder, assumed control over air space preempted by. the
United States of America under the Act, and violated the Constitution of the
United States. The Court further felt that in view of the large investment in
Idlewild and the employment created thereby, as well as the potential loss of
revenue and the hazards to air navigation if the ordinance was enforced, the
plaintiffs would suffer irreparable injury unless a preliminary injunction were
granted; and accordingly, issued the injunction. We understand that an appeal
is now pending in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
Another interesting opinion is found in the decision of the California Su-
preme Court in Anderson v. Souza 1952 U.S. Av. R. 216. (The decisions of the
lower court in this case are cited in footnotes 21 and 24 above.) In line with
the recent trend, the Court declared that a general injunction against an airport's
operations should not be granted in case of a nuisance, but only an injunction
against specific types of operations which created the alleged nuisance.
